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CORPORATE LAW IN LEGAL
THEORY AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP:
FROM CLASSICISM TO FEMINISM
By KATHLEEN A. LAHEY* AND SARAH W. SALTER**
Corporate law scholarship is dominated by traditional (masculist) forms of inquiry
that ignore the sources and consequences of corporatism and effectively support the
business corporation as a situs of male domination. Professors Lahey and Salter
suggest that a challenge to the dominant perspective must come from groups, such
as women, that have been socially marginalized and have not therefore fully internalized
the terms of the discourse of bureaucratic capitalism. Only when female legal scholars
actively study and promote feminist values such as participation, decentralization,
and power sharing will a serious challenge to the patriarchal mentality of the business
world be possible.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are some connections between feminist inquiries into cor-
poratism and (masculisti) legal scholarship on corporations. Even more
interesting, however, are the gaps or divergences between the two
approaches to the area. It is in these connections and gaps that we have
found the most challenging ideas for future work.
o Copyright, 1985, Kathleen A. Lahey and Sarah W. Salter.
* Faculty of Law, University of Windsor, Windsor, Ont.
** Faculty of Law, New England School of Law, Boston, Mass.
Daniel Boen, Law Library, University of Windsor, assisted us in collecting many of the materials
that we discuss in this paper. We received generous assistance in developing and clarifying the
ideas in this paper from members of the corporate law study group at the 1985 Feminist Critical
Legal Studies Conference, Newton, Mass.; in addition, Judy Greenberg has provided ongoing support
and feedback in this process. A note on citation form: because part of our thesis is that gender
matters, even in relation to corporate law scholarship, we have rejected the tradition of abbreviating
first names, and instead have spelled out all first names in full (when they have been available
to us).
I There are several terms that can be used to refer to nonfeminist work. Some radical feminists
use the term 'malestream' to emphasize that nonfeminist work is usually written by men, and
that men have a virtual monopoly on 'mainstream' thought. Other radical feminists have begun
to use the concept of'masculist' (or 'masculinist') to communicate the same point. We have decided
to use 'masculist' in this essay because it more effectively enables the reader to think of gender-
female people as being 'masculist' when they have resisted feminist analyses and (remain) committed
to malestream projects, issues, or methodologies. This choice should not be seen as an attempt
to distance ourselves from the alleged essentialism of radical feminism; rather it should be interpreted
to draw attention to women's complicity and acquiescence (sometimes willing, sometimes not)
in male privilege and hegemony. At this particular point in history, 'masculist' may be somewhat
under-inclusive, if it is read as excluding gender-female people, but it is probably not seriously
over-inclusive as regards to gender-male people.
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The format of this paper is fairly simple. In Part II, we first review
the literature on women and corporations; this is a short exercise because
women scholars did not really start talking about corporations as a feminist
issue until 1977. This literature reflects three of the main tendencies
of feminist thought: liberal feminism, socialist feminism, and radical
feminism. We argue that the radical feminist perspective offers the most
powerful critique of corporate law, but that this approach was foresha-
dowed by the other two perspectives, and is clearly aided by the earlier
literature. In Part III, we review the development of Canadian legal
scholarship on corporate and securities law by employing a theoretical
paradigm that places classical legal thought in tension with realist legal
thought. This paradigm provides an explanatory basis for talking about
contemporary modes of scholarship as being either reconstructed clas-
sicisms (tinged with the realist experience) or oppositional.2 The discussion
in Part III of the paper discloses the rather limited and fairly recent
impact that realist, or even reconstructed classical thought, has had on
corporate law scholarship, and the virtual nonexistence of scholarly work
that reflects an oppositional approach. However, there are a few works
in the reconstruction and oppositional modes, which begin to touch on
the issues raised by the feminist analysis and, as well, demonstrate where
the gaps between feminist and male stream approaches are located. The
fourth section of this paper describes some of those gaps and connections
and suggests directions for future work.
II. FEMINIST CRITIQUES OF THE CORPORATION
The types of concerns that contemporary feminists have raised in
relation to corporations have been fairly typical of the main strands of
political theory that have developed over the last twenty years. Liberal
feminist analysis of corporations has tended to focus on the constraints
and opportunities that organizational structures generate for individuals,
especially for women. Predictably, this kind of analysis is preoccupied
with changing those aspects of organizational structure that affect
constraints and opportunities, while being less concerned with the legal
or political implications of those organizational features. Socialist feminist
(and Marxist feminist) analysis of the corporation has followed the
masculist critique of corporatism. The corporate form as a legal and
2 This descriptive framework is based loosely on Elizabeth Mensch, "The History of Mainstream
Legal Thought" in David Kairys, ed., The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (1982) 18. It
turned out to be easier to relate this framework to the legal literature than other frameworks that
have been suggested for this symposium, perhaps because scholars who are working in this area
are still having a difficult time breaking free from purely doctrinal methodologies and inquiring
into the determinants of public policy.
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administrative structure is treated as an invariable 'given' in socialist
feminist thought, and most theorists have focused on the cultural con-
sequences of the market-based culture of corporate capitalism - alie-
nation, the devaluation of women's non-waged and waged work, the
role of the family (and of women) in corporate capitalism, and the
appropriation of women's reproductive labour. These are important issues
in feminist thought, but they do not directly confront the role of the
legal system in creating the corporate entity as a unique institution, and
the result is a literature that largely fails to explore the social consequences
of the form.
Although the liberal feminist and socialist feminist literature on
women and corporations constitutes a major contribution to scholarship,
it is only in recent radical feminist writing that we find attempts to directly
confront the sources as well as the consequences of corporatism. This
theoretical work combines feminist methodology with political analysis
to uncover some basic perceptions about the nature of corporations in
western industrialized societies. It is therefore to this passage of radical
feminist literature that this essay looks in developing a feminist critique
of Canadian legal scholarship on corporate law, and inferentially, of
corporate law itself.
A. Liberal Feminism
Although contemporary feminists have almost always had a theory
of how social and productive3 organizations should be structured, this
theory was usually found in practice (praxis) rather than in writing.
Moreover, its praxis has tended to be restricted to situations in which
women have been free to make their own arrangements. Almost by
definition, feminist theories about organizations have been found in the
praxis of alternative feminist institutions such as collectives, cooperatives,
alternative families, and feminist communities., Except to the extent that
these alternative institutions have involved men who themselves have
3 The limitations of the language have defeated us here: all social or cultural institutions 'produce'
something; that is their very function. Some institutions produce material things, like food, clothing,
shelter, and so on; these are generally thought of as 'productive' or 'economic' institutions. We
need a word for 'productive' that connotes material production but does not by exclusion devalue
other types of cultural production. What is this word? In the meantime, we will use 'productive'.
4 See, for example, the feminist processes and educational institutions chronicled in Charlotte
Bunch & Sandra Pollack, eds., Learning Our Way: Essays in Feminist Education (1983) at 114-
68. These essays are particularly useful in drawing out the organizational implications of different
tendencies in feminist thought, and in illustrating the differing weights that liberal, radical, and
other feminists place on (dynamic) organizational processes, as contrasted with (static and idealized)
organizational forms.
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a committed alternative lifestyle, there has been little interface between
feminist organizational praxis and male-dominated institutions like bus-
iness corporations.5
1. 'How to succeed' guidebooks
At the same time that feminists were developing alternative insti-
tutions, other self-identified feminists were joining (or at least coming
to a feminist consciousness within) male-defined and male-dominated
institutions, and were developing a written body of theory about their
experiences. Not surprisingly, this literature, which began to appear in
about 1975 or 1976, was concerned with 'how to succeed' in male-
dominated institutions, especially in the business corporations of the
productive sector of the monetized economy. Books like The Managerial
Woman6 concentrated on the psychological and sociological profiles of
women who 'had made it' in the traditional business environment, and
advised other women how to rise above their gender differences in
competing for management jobs. According to this type of analysis, factors
like birth order, family composition, and early relationships were seen
as the cause of differential types of achievements among the women
executives in their sample. Women were counselled to rise above their
sex class (and presumably above their birth order, and so forth) by
accepting the fact of their gender difference and taking specific steps
to deal with its effects on their career options. Thus women are advised
to decide whether they really want to succeed, to be very specific in
career planning, to find a senior helper (the 'mentor' strategy), and to
be active and risk-taking instead of being reactive and security conscious.7
Works like The Managerial Woman do perform the valuable function
of explaining to women (and to interested men), in a specific and
contextualized analysis, not only why women should not discount them-
selves, but also how to make fairly detailed plans for advancement.
However, this approach is seriously flawed, for it puts most of the
responsibility on women to change themselves in order to fit into pre-
existing modes of organization, while paying very little attention to
whether those types of changes are good for women, whether the so-
called executive role is good for people in general, and whether the
5 For example, some feminist lawyers have had to struggle with practical questions like how
to register a collective or a steering committee - both of which are non-hierarchical forms of
management - as the 'officers' of business corporation, without giving in to the expedient of
having people act as officers for the sole purpose of registration.
6 Margaret Hennig & Anne Jardin, The Managerial Woman (1977).
7 Ibid at 157-62.
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institutional features that supposedly call for those kinds of personal
initiatives are optimally designed. This same criticism can be made of
most of the 'how to succeed' books that have been published by liberal
feminists (and by their sympathizers) since the mid-1970s.8 However,
even the more scholarly studies of this genre fail to move much beyond
the 'individual model for change' that one can see being promoted in
the corporate survival manuals.+ Thus, it is not surprising that only tentative
suggestions for organizational change are found even in the best of the
scholarly literature on women and corporations.
2. Seeds of a structural critique
The most influential of the scholarly survival manuals is Rosabeth
Moss Kanter's book on the effect that organizational structures have
on individual behaviourlo in which she critiques the "individual models
of change" and offers some suggestions for structural change to overcome
the limits of the individual model. Although Kanter has become increas-
ingly absorbed with the personnel problems of mainstream corporations
like IBM and Digital, her early work contains some promising (but not
fully developed) elements of a feminist theory of organizations. Her
critique of the individual model of change verges on the radical; she
argues that "repair programs" for women perpetuate the basic problem:
they allow managers to rationalize their discrimination against women;
they ignore the similarities between women and men as well as the
differences between various women; they treat people as being pro-
8 Most of the writing that falls into this category is unabashedly concerned with women's
survival in business corporations: see, for example, Barbara Boricha-Kovack, Power and Love: How
to Work for Success and Still Care for Others (1982); Sylvia Senter, Women at Work A Psychologist's
Secrets to Getting Ahead in Business (1982); Dean Peskin, Womaning: Overcoming Male Dominance
on Executive Row (1981); Mary Welch, Networking: The Great New Way for Women to Get Ahead
(1981); Shade Crain, Taking Stock- A Woman's Guide to Corporate Success (1977); Betty Harragon,
Games Mother Never Taught Yoc Corporate Gamesmanship [sic] for Women (1977); Cf. Elizabeth
Gregg MacGibbon, Manners in Business (1936).
9 See, for example, Agnes Missirian, The Corporate Connection.: Why Executive Women Need
Mentors to Reach the Top (1982); Barbara Forisha & Barbara Goldman, eds., Outsiders on the
Inside Women and Organizations (1981); Cynthia Epstein & Rose Coser, eds., Access to Power
Cross-National Studies of Women and Elites (1981); Rosabeth Moss Kanter, The Tale of "0" On
Being Different in an Organization (1980); Ruth Halcomb, Women Making It Patterns and Profiles
of Success (1981); Bette Stead, ed., Women in Management (1978); Caroline Bird, Enterprising Women
(1976); Eli Ginsberg & Alice Yohalem, Corporate Lib: Women's Challenge to Management (1973);
Roslyn Willett, "Working in a Man's World: The Woman Executive" in V. Gornick & B. Moran,
eds., Women in Sexist Society: Studies in Power and Powerlessness (1979). We are indebted to Dan
Tarullo's bibliography on women and law for assistance in collecting the references in this note
and note 8.
10 Rosabeth Moss Kanter, Men and Women of the Corporation (1977).
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grammed by their gender, with men being cast in the role of villains;
they absolve the system itself of responsibility for manufacturing the
psychology of its workers; and they pit gender groups against each other
instead of focusing on structural changes." In Kanter's analysis, char-
acteristics that other researchers have described as "sex differences" in
workplace behaviour are really the result of individual responses either
to structural conditions, or to one's place in the organization. The core
of her program for change, which is influenced by her research on
successful alternative and utopian communities, is her conclusion that
the use of hierarchical organizational structures results in the fragmen-
tation of groups, and that fragmentation in turn generates dichotomy,
competition, blocked opportunities, powerlessness, and nonproductive
adaptive behaviour.2
From the seeds of this structural critique, Kanter develops the
alternative organizational pattern that has become the basis of her
successful consulting business. The main elements of this pattern are
decentralizing decision-making processes, reversing the bureaucratization
of modern management and administrative structures, flattening hierar-
chies, distributing formal authority more widely, improving commun-
ication and access to knowledge at all levels, and increasing participation
by all types of workers.,3 Her rationale for these structural changes is
largely based on feminist principles of empowerment, which stress the
importance of increased individual autonomy and discretion within the
institution.,,
Although Kanter's insights contain the seeds of a radical feminist
critique of corporate and securities law, she actually stops well short
of that critique in two important respects. First, she is primarily concerned
with the problem of integrating women into male-dominated business
corporations, not with changing corporations so that they become places
where present women can become more fully involved.,5 Second, she
concludes that mere organizational change itself is not an adequate
solution to women's problems in corporations, for the whole structure
of the monetized economy continues to produce large corporations, which
I Ibid at 262-64.
12 Ibid at 264, 266.
13 Ibd at 273, 276.
14 Ibid at 277.
15 This enterprise appears to have been a failure; Kanter reports that corporate management
is even more exclusively male than it was seven years ago, for few women in earlier management
training programs seem to have achieved management positions. See Susan McHenry, "Rosabeth
Moss Kanter" (January 1985) 13:7 Ms. 62 at 108. The term 'present women' suggests that the
category 'woman' will exhibit different characteristics in (future) different types of organizations.
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in turn produce problems of size, hierarchy, organizationally-induced 'sex
differences', and so on.,6 As a specialist in the relationships between
organizational structures and human behaviours, Kanter does not develop
a critique of the economic and legal determinants of corporate size and
market behaviour. Yet the seeds are there for a more thoroughgoing
and radical critique, for Kanter has made crucial links between gender
and organizational structure that have been ignored in other feminist
work of its era.
B. Socialist Feminism
While liberal feminist analysis focuses its critique of the corporation
on the effects of corporate structure on the women (and men) who work
in those institutions, or on how those women can 'get ahead' more
effectively, socialist feminist analysis is more concerned with the effect
of corporatism on the larger culture, and on the role of women as workers
in that culture. In the latter analysis, the business corporation as such
is certainly discussed directly, but it also takes on a nearly symbolic
significance in the development of a socialist critique of capitalism that
takes account of gender. This observation is not meant as a criticism
of the socialist feminist treatment of business corporations but rather
is made merely to emphasize that a literature that treats the dominance
of business corporations as a given cannot be expected to disclose a
definitive discussion of the legal structure of corporations. A brief look
at one of the leading socialist feminist discussions of corporatism in
Canada will illustrate this point.
Dorothy Smith's paper on corporate capitalism17 parallels Kanter's
liberal feminist critique insofar as Smith argues that the way production
is organized - through the institutions known as corporations and fami-
lies - determines the social roles of women. Smith argues that the rise
of capitalism has not only alienated workers from their labour, but also
separated consumption from production, families from the productive
economy, and reproduction from the resulting public sphere. This analysis
echoes Kanter's themes of fragmentation and hierarchy, for the very
functions of human existence are split up between the home and the
market, and ranked in a hierarchical manner that devalues and oppresses
some people along both class and gender lines. The end result, of course,
16 Supra; note 10 at 285.
17 Dorothy Smith, "Women, the Family and Corporate Capitalism" in Marylee Stephenson,
ed., Women in Canada (1977) 17.
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is gender and class determinations of human behaviour, which behaviour
is then interpreted as being natural to women and men. For example,
instrumental behaviour that is associated with productive group activity
becomes associated with the male personality because men tend to
dominate these types of activities, while expressive behaviour associated
with sustaining family relations becomes associated with the female
personality because women perform the expressive function in a gender-
determined and fragmented system of production.,8
1. Structural critique
Unlike Kanter's critique of the role of the corporation, which is
really limited to a discussion of fragmentation and hierarchy as being
key features of organizations, Dorothy Smith develops a detailed critique
of the legal structure of the corporation in order to discover just how
corporate capitalism (unlike the earlier form of entrepreneurial capitalism)
mediates social behaviour. Dorothy Smith starts with Berle and Means's
notion of the business corporation as a form of property relations, in
which corporate ownership replaces private ownership, and with Baran
and Sweezey's understanding of the economic process of monopoly capital
as an economic and an ethical end. She then speculates that the business
corporation is an artificial individual that appropriates not only labour
and surplus value, but also the human capacity for individual action.9
In what we consider to be a key passage in the feminist literature on
corporate personality, Dorothy Smith writes:
The subordination of the individual at the managerial level to the corporation
as enterprise, introduces a crucial mediating term in the relation between class
and economic enterprise, that of authority. In relation to its individual actors the
corporate enterprise is constituted as a system of authorizations by which individual
actions are appropriated to the enterprise. What he does becomes its act.2 0
Smith ties this appropriation to the legal concept of agency, which
permits one individual to possess or own (in a legal sense) the acts of
others. Since this appropriation affects managers, as distinct from workers,
not only is the manager's labour controlled and appropriated, but the
manager's entire personality, capacity for action, judgment, and authority
is appropriated by the enterprise form. Building on Weber's analysis of
bureaucratic authority, Smith concludes that an individual's office now
confers authority that was originally referable to the ownership of private
property, and in the individual's exercise of that authority, the corporation
18 Ibid at 20.
9 Ibid at 23-24.
20 Ibid at 24.
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now reappropriates that authority.2 The modem business corporation
was developed to serve as an agent or instrumentality for individual
owners of private property, but it is now individual managers of the
corporation who have become its agents and instrumentalities.
Smith's concept of agency or reversed instrumentalism carries with
it the potential for a searching critique of corporate law itself, for the
notion of agency or instrumentalism immediately raises the question of
where the corporation finds the ethical and commercial standards that
it imposes on the judgment and energies of its managers. Part of this
source is the positive law of business corporations: an individual manager's
actions belong to the manager only to the extent that the manager occupies
an executive position, and those actions are at all times determined by
legal ideas about loyalty, attentiveness, competence, judgment, and
honesty in dealings with other managers, shareholders, regulators, workers,
and consumers. This is a complex version of Marxian appropriation of
labour, and it is useful in clarifying the relationship between legal norms
and corporate structure. However, one must ask whether this analysis
can be described as 'feminist'. In Smith's hands it is, for she uses it
to demonstrate how women's productive and reproductive labour is
appropriated by corporate capitalism, and to explain just where the market
and family economies, for both working class and middle class women,
fit into the process of the appropriation of human existence by artificial
entities. Even without having drawn those connections, she must be
considered to have entered into a feminist critique of the content of
corporate law itself by drawing attention to the connections between
instrumentalism in the practices of male domination and the constitution
of the business corporation.
2. Women as workers
It is in her application of the reversed instrumentalism model to
women's labour that Smith is most obviously writing from a feminist
perspective. This portion of her argument will be summarized briefly
in order to give some idea of this application, which tends to take her
discussion away from the legal structure of the business corporation and
toward a cultural critique of the effects of its structure. Yet, the notion
of reversed instrumentalism also plays a role in this aspect of her critique.
Having theorized that corporate capitalism appropriates (predom-
inantly) male workers in distinct ways that correlate to class, Smith then
21 Ibid. at 25.
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examines the effect of that appropriation on their families, and on the
women in those families. In contrast to the involvement of the elite ruling
and managing class, only the labour of working class men is appropriated
by corporations. Thus, the corporation can be considered to appropriate
only the labour of working class women, insofar as the family functions
as the place where labourers are stored during 'leisure' hours, and where
they are serviced, maintained, fed, cleaned, solaced, motivated, and
reproduced.22 However, the corporation appropriates the entire family
of middle class managers, for as Smith concludes, the corporate structure
requires that managers subordinate themselves and their so-called private
interests to the corporation's goals, objectives, day to day practices, and
ethics. As the moral status of the manager becomes central to a particular
person's acceptability as a manager, "the middle-class family becomes
directed toward creating and sustaining that moral status."23 Thus the
entire middle class family becomes charged with the enactment of the
moral order that is produced by the corporation, and the middle class
woman becomes responsible for 'managing' this moral order in a way
that mirrors her spouse's agency within the corporate structure.24 This
aspect of Smith's analysis brilliantly extends Marxist feminist analysis
of women's non-waged labour,2s for the 'products' of middle class women's
labour - the home, the children, the 'lifestyle' - are all seen as images
of the corporate moral order, and are not determined by human needs
as concrete or knowable as replenishing labour power.26
Smith's analysis is a breakthrough in many ways, but it is a theoretical
work that makes no attempt to answer two questions that a feminist
legal scholar would then ask: What are the values of the moral order
that is enforced by corporate capitalism through its manager-agents, both
women and men? Exactly what role does the legal system play in this
enforcement? The second question is clearly within the realm of the
legal scholar.27 The first question is answered by Smith only by implication,
leaving further exploration to radical feminist analysis. However, it is
interesting to note some of the values that characterize the moral order
that has been developed and sustained by corporate capitalism: the
22 Ibid at 22.
23 Ibid at 32-33.
24 Ibid at 33.
2 See, for example, Mariarosa Dalla Costa & Selma James, The Power of Women and the
Subversion of the Community (1972).
26 See supra, note 17 at 33-44 for the details of this analysis of the role of middle class
women, and of the other members of the family. Her contribution is unique, both in its class analysis,
and in her insistence on tracing the effects of fragmented ownership out to the culture in which
the fragmentation occurs.
27 The question of malestream scholarship and enforcement is dealt with in Part III.
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legitimacy of agency and instrumentalism; appropriation of personality
(as well as of labour power); externality; commodification of human
existence; hierarchical arrangements; 'dead end' products such as
consumption-as-display (and not just for aesthetic purposes); image-
keeping as work; trivialization of survival tasks; role as identity; wholeness
as dysfunction (or even as deviance); achievement as success; respect
for authority; and service for love.8
C. Radical Feminism
Taken together, the liberal and socialist feminist critiques of the
corporate entity in contemporary culture give a lot of insight into the
effects of this form of social and economic organization on the individual
behaviour of corporate managers as workers, on the function of women
in the family and in the workplace, and on the very choices of objectives
that are made by economic actors. Radical feminist literature on the
corporation adds two further dimensions to this analysis: it explores the
reasons behind the development of the corporate form in the first place
and the role that it plays in serving the needs of liberal and capitalist
patriarchy. Furthermore, it has generated a theoretical basis for the
development of alternative forms that reflect the organizational principles
of radical feminism. Both of these issues are surveyed briefly to conclude
this review of the contributions of feminist thought to corporate legal
scholarship.
1. Fragmentation and bureaucratization
The theme of fragmentation runs through all feminist critiques of
the corporation. For Kanter, fragmentation results from hierarchical
structure, competition, and organizationally induced sex differences, while
for Smith, it arises (for middle class managers) when human activity
and personality are separated from sources of ethical influence. Smith
comes very close to seeing corporate capitalism as a complete social
system; she traces the ethos of corporatism through most aspects of middle
class existence. Yet this is still not a complete picture, for Smith almost
completely exempts the working classes from her analysis, and completely
ignores the unemployed or underemployed.
28 See, generally, supra, note 17 at 33-44; see also Sarah Salter, "Extended Identity: An
Alternative Intuition of Justice" (New England School of Law) [unpublished]; Carol Gilligan,
"Feminist Discourse, Moral Values and the Law - A Conversation" (1985) 34 Buffalo L. Rev.
11; Angela Miles, "Ideological Hegemony in Political Discourse: Women's Specificity and Equality"
in Angela Miles & Geraldine Finn, eds., Feminism in Canada (1983) 213.
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Kathleen Ferguson29 goes beyond both Kanter and Smith in char-
acterizing this as an age of bureaucracy, in which the bureaucratic mode
of organization is "a structure and a process which adds up to the total
social system of our age." Ferguson is certainly in agreement with Smith
when she contends that in the culture of bureaucratic capitalism - whether
practiced by the business corporation or by the state - "certain social
acts are established and maintained, certain social objects are valued,
certain languages are spoken, certain types of behaviour are required,
and certain motivations are encouraged."30 Her analysis surpasses Smith's,
however, when she concludes that bureaucratic discourse, which she sees
as a refinement of liberal discourse, is the dominant discourse of our
culture and, according to radical feminist theory, is also the distinctly
male discourse of power.3'
Ferguson makes the connection between the corporate form of
organization and "the distinctly male discourse of power" by examining
how bureaucratic organizations actually operate - through discipline
and control.32 The notion of 'control' is the key in joining this analysis
with discourses of power. Ferguson describes bureaucratic control as
dependent on separation, isolation, and depersonalization, as well as
depowerment of the individuals, knowledge, and activities that it organizes.
Wendy Brown has written an evocative interpretation of Ferguson's
concept of bureaucracy:
Bureaucracy fragments whole knowledges, whole purposes, and whole human beings
into disjunct and one-dimensional parts, each of which is rendered dependent upon
bureaucratic organization for its existence as a fragment. Bureaucracy is an
instrument of total power which also mystifies its power through an abstract,
universal, "politically neutral" discourse of efficiency, rules, roles and procedures. 3
When described in these terms, it becomes apparent that the business
corporation is the paradigm of modernist bureaucracy. Its very legal form
is a fragmentation of the whole range of entrepreneurial activities and
of human judgment. Its method is "neutral" rules and roles and its goal
is efficiency and domination.
29 Kathleen Ferguson, The Feminist Case Against Bureaucracy (1984).
30 Ibid
31 Wendy Brown, "Challenging Bureaucracy" (1984) 2 Women's Review of Books 16, reviewing
Kathleen Ferguson's book.
32 Ferguson's notion of 'discipline', as well as her concern with discourse and bureaucracy,
is borrowed from Michel Foucault, a radical critic of the modem social order. Foucault himself,
however, has borrowed heavily from radical feminism in many passages, so it is fair to say that
feminist radical thought and masculist radical thought have both made significant contributions
to Ferguson's analysis. See generally Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality (1978).
33 Supra; note 31 at 16.
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For those who are inclined to the radical feminist perspective on
contemporary culture, the business corporation is a perfection of the
masculist vision of self - existence as property, separation of accoun-
tability and enjoyment, abstract rules as justice, domination as ownership.34
The only irony in this scenario is the fact that the corporate legal form
so perfects and depoliticizes domination that even human 'managers'
(the human equivalents of the business corporation) have become the
instruments and agents of the corporation, rather than the title-holders
of its immense powers, which they had initially set out to be.
2. Alternative organizational principles
The radical feminist analysis of corporations, especially when read
together with the liberal and socialist feminist critiques, certainly sets
out the terms for a feminist critique of Canadian corporate law. Furth-
ermore, it has generated a basis for developing an alternative approach
to organizational structures.
It will be recalled that Kanter began her inquiry into the effects
of organizational structure on individual behaviour because of her interest
in alternative and utopian organizations. She made numerous suggestions
for alternative forms of organization - decentralization, nonhierarchical
leadership, individual responsibility and discretion, diversity of gender,
ethnic and racial experiences in workersjob rotation, group co-operation,
and access to system knowledge.35 Notwithstanding that these are excellent
suggestions, corporate behaviour over the last eight years has made it
clear that organizations can adopt many of these techniques and still
retain their essential character. Obviously, something is missing from
Kanter's formula. Radical feminists posit that the missing element is an
ethical structure that is capable of challenging the moral order of the
dominant discourse, and of uncovering the essentially patriarchal nature
of the dominations upon which corporate culture depends.
34 Compare this projection of the masculist vision of self with its counterweight - pornography.
Also developed as both a vehicle for and an antidote to separation and domination, pornography
returns to men that which they lost in projecting the corporatized self. See Kathleen Lahey,
"Pornography and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Toward a Theory of Actual
Gender Equality" (forthcoming, New England W.). Judy Greenberg has elaborated on the connection
between corporate culture and pornography in drawing attention to the violent and heterosexual
language that the law uses to describe relationships between the legal process and the corporate
process ('piercing the corporate veil') and between owners and corporations ('raping the corporation').
The fact that human males feel that it is urgent for them to dominate corporations seems apparent;
that human males feel that they have to impute a female nature to corporations in order to facilitate
that domination (or to reverse the reversed instrumentalism initially set up by the corporate form)
seems to parallel other contemporary uses of pornography.
35 Supra, note 10 at 278-79.
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Ferguson has drawn on the work of psychoanalytic and moral
feminism in identifying 'feminist' ethical values with which to challenge
the ethics of corporatism. Her goal is nothing less than to help generate
a "discourse of opposition" to the discourse of bureaucratic patriarchy.
From Carol Gilligan she takes permission to speak of women's unique
moral judgments and ethical consciousness,36 which are in direct opposition
to the masculist sense of the actualization of the separate self as essence
of the modem project. From Nancy Chodorow she receives the idea
of autonomous individuality as the masculist resolution of the loss of
mothering that the male child experiences when he discovers his "other-
ness".3, Ferguson's vision of an alternative discourse is thus founded upon
both women's sense of identity through connection, and not through
separation and fragmentation, and women's sense of justice as being
achieved through an ethic of responsibility, and not through an ethic
of rules, rights, and entitlements.
Ferguson's critique of corporatism as a form of fragmentation and
bureaucratization, and her vision of alternative principles of organization
based on ethics of care, responsibility, connection, and sharing, suggest
several major tasks for the legal scholar. The first task is to reread the
literature of corporate law, including not only primary sources but also
scholarly commentary, in order to develop a more detailed understanding
of the values and practices of the legal subculture of the business
corporation, and its relationships to the bureaucratized culture that we
live in now. This task will involve legal scholars not only in their roles
as lawyers but also in their contextualizing interdisciplinary work as legal
historians, sociologists, economists, and so on.
A second task is to retrieve and relearn the important feminist work
that has already been done on alternative models for the organization
of so-called productive activity. For example, Flora Tristan, a French
radical feminist, developed the first proposal for syndicalist production
in 1843, in which she outlined a plan for a worker's self-governing
corporation.38 Contemporary feminists have remained actively involved
in this project, notwithstanding that little attention has been paid to the
strictly legal aspects of alternative forms of organization.39
36 See Carol Gilligan, In A Different Voice (1981).
37 See Nancy Chodorow, "Family Structure and Feminine Personality" in Michelle Rosaldo
& Louise Lamphere, eds., Woman, Culture, and Society (1974) 43; see also Salter, supra, note 28,
which draws connections between Chodorow's work and the institution of private property (although
not to private property that takes the corporate form).
38 Flora Tristan, L'union Ouvrikre (1844).
39 See, for example, Halina Zaleski, "Women in Production Co-operatives: Unique Problems
- Special Benefits" (1982) 11 RFR/DRF 24. Research into the legal aspects of alternative
organizations would be especially rewarding, for two types of information could be obtained: how
is business association law being used to create new forms (when it is); and, when it is not, what
types of informal arrangements are being made, how are they documented or otherwise recorded/
managed, and what alternative forms of dispute resolution (if any) are being used to resolve ongoing
problems?
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A third task, which builds on the first two, is to begin rethinking
the legal principles and judicial concepts that determine the moral order
within which organization arrangements are now made. There should
also be a conscious effort to develop a detailed feminist critique of
corporate practices and corporate law that reveals its ongoing role in
perpetuating patriarchal values and power relations. It is this last task
that will draw feminist legal scholars into a critique of the practices
and legal norms of present corporatist and bureaucratized culture.
111. MAINSTREAM CORPORATE LAW SCHOLARSHIP
One important aspect of these tasks is to understand what role
Canadian legal scholarship has already played in the ongoing discourse
of bureaucratic capitalism. This section of the paper samples the issues
that corporate legal scholars have thought are important, and how they
relate (or do not relate) to the analyses that were developed in Part
Il of this essay. This section also uses a theoretical approach, for there
is a basic relationship between the types of legal theory (explicit or implicit)
that are employed in a study and the types of material that are considered
to be relevant to the study. This section of the essay places classical
legal thought in a dialectical relationship with realist thought, and then
views post-realist legal scholarship as a series of attempts to synthesize
the classical and realist modes. These 'reconstructions' of the classical
mode are not the only tendencies in corporate legal scholarship that
are found in contemporary literature; they are complemented by the
emergence of 'oppositional' schools of thought that are associated with
the neo-Marxist, law and society, and law and economics movements.40
A. Classicism
Canadian legal scholarship in the area of corporations and securities
law is no exception to the general pattern of legal scholarship described
in the SSHRC report.,, It is overwhelmingly doctrinal in the sense that
40 Supra, note 2 at 18. This framework is useful because it draws attention away from the
idealized classical and realist modes (neither of which can be perfectly realized) and places it
on the nonidealized modes (reconstructed classicisms and oppositional modes) that fall along the
continuum that connects the two idealized and polarized modes. Note how the theoretical approach
used in this section of the paper differs from the approach used in section II. These differences
are, we think, symptomatic of feminist and masculist thought more generally. For further exploration
of this point see Kathleen Lahey, "... . Until Women Themselves Have Told All They Have to
Tell.... (1985) 23 Osgoode Hall LJ. 519.
41 Consultative Group on Research and Education in Law, Social Sciences and Humanities
Research Council, Law and Learning (Chair H.W. Arthurs) (1983) at 78-83, 89.
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cases and statutes are its primary material, and traditional noncontextual
case analysis is its dominant method. Choice of topics and methods for
scholarly examination appears to have generally been an unsystematized
exercise of personal preferences. Predictably, there are gaps and im-
balances in the body of commentary that has been published. Scholarly
output has taken the form of articles and essays, rather than monographs
or treatises. A disproportionately large amount of scholarly output in
the area is published by civil law scholars in comparison to common
lawyers.
The predominant mode of this scholarship falls into the classical
(or doctrinal) tradition, in which cases and statutes are examined for
principles that can be applied to new situations.2 An excellent example
of how classical legal consciousness deals with legal materials is found
in an article on the floating charge by one G.Curtis, published in 1941.43
In an attempt to theorize and justify the law on floating charges (a type
of secured obligation), Curtis clearly believed that autonomous law could
come to the correct conclusions, without reference to any other features
of the social system. As Curtis wrote:
[T]he development shows the capacity of our law to expand and to supply social
controls of its own motion. The merits of judicial courage in the right places
have never been better illustrated; indeed, "bold" was the characterization ...
of Lord MacNaughton in the Tailby Case.
44
This kind of analysis is typical of legal classicism, which treats law as
an objective system of knowledge that is capable of providing answers
to all questions about social and economic behaviour, and which is separate
from other spheres of knowledge.
Although it is easy to be critical of classical legal consciousness,
especially when it is viewed in an historical context, it is important to
realize that it is still considered to be a perfectly legitimate style of
discourse. For example, last year one William Moull published an article
on business law and the implementation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights, which treated autonomous law as being a sufficient theoretical
42 The styles of argument that are used in the classical tradition are those that are legitimated
by custom and usage. The distinguishing characteristic of classical legal thought (or liberal legalism,
as it is sometimes known) is its belief in a formal and autonomous legal order, in which legal
doctrine is considered to reflect a coherent view of culture. Legal doctrine is believed to be politically,
economically, and psychologically neutral, and legal reasoning is considered to be a process that
will yield the 'correct' result. The classical view of legal reasoning is actually an idealized decision-
making process, in which the 'law' on an issue is considered to be predictable and discoverable
by anyone with a reasonable amount of legal skill. The 'facts' can be determined through appropriate
evidentiary and procedural rules, and the 'right' answer can be determined by any fair and reasonable
judge. See generally supra, note 2 at 19-23.
43 G.F. Curtis, "The Theory of the Floating Charge" (1941-42) 4 U. Toronto LJ. 131.
4 Ibid at 150.
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approach for deciding how the Charter ought to apply to corporations.45
Moull's concern is to determine whether corporations can be considered
to be 'persons' and whether administrative agencies, the Toronto Securities
Exchange, and Crown corporations can be considered to be 'government'.
Going no further than published legal doctrine on these issues, Moull
has proposed a 'security of the person' argument in which he stretches
the classical view of the function of the corporate entity (which he says
is to hold property) to apply to the Charter. He concludes that to divest
a corporation of 'property' without due process is to imperil the security
of the person.46 This analysis is typically classicist not only because it
relies only on 'legal' knowledge to resolve social and economic problems,
but also because bits of that 'knowledge' (for example, the judicial
pronouncement that the purpose of the corporation is to hold property)
are taken out of their original context and used in an ahistorical,
noncontextual manner to produce new 'knowledge' (for example, the
knowledge that the corporation is a 'person').
The classical legal tradition in Canada has not been impervious
to its own limitations. As early as 1931, some legal scholars seemed
to recognize the inadequacies of the classical perspective, and to doubt
(at least implicitly) the omniscience of law. For example, in a treatise
on Canadian corporate law, Franklin Wegenast tried to describe how
'the law' on corporate names might be ascertained. Admitting that the
law on the point was not at all clear, he suggested the following procedure:
(1) examine the reported decisions, (2) try to build a consistent theory,
keeping in mind: (a) general principles of English corporate law on names,
(b) Canadian statutory provisions, (c) the basic differences between
chartered and registered companies, and (d) the relation of chartered
companies to the courts and to the executive.47 Even this extremely
tentative attempt to take account of public policy would not be sufficient
to eliminate the essential uncertainty of the law on this point, for Wegenast
admitted that the theory that would reconcile the largest number of cases
would be 'correct', but that its logical results would be 'untenable'48 In
other passages, corporate legal scholars express a sense of the limitations
of classical analysis; 'public policy' is not openly adopted as a better
guide, but legal doctrine is described as "the stultifying strictures of
45 William Moull, "Business Law Implications of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms"
(1983-84) 8 Can. Bus. U. 449.
46 Ibid at 476.
47 Franklin Wegenast, The Law of Canadian Companies (1931) at 119-20.
48 Ibid at 120.
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common law consideration.",9 Further, judicial reasoning is criticized for
substituting "scholasticism for intelligible judicial interpretation,"5o and
use of settled but irrelevant judicial doctrine in interpreting new statutory
provisions is described as "an unnecessary exercise which can divert
the court's attention from its primary duty."s:
These suggestions that pure classicism is somehow inadequate to
the demands of corporate legal scholarship should not be read as anything
more than just that, mere suggestions. Legal classicism still thrives in
Canadian corporate legal scholarship. For example, writing in 1981,
Edwin Kroft published a major article in which he closely examined
the United States approach to minority squeeze outs. Kroft recounted
the United States approach, which seeks to take serious account of socio-
economic factors in deciding on what types of regulation might be
appropriate responses to squeeze outs, but he concluded that such an
analytic framework should not be adopted in Canada. His main reason
for rejecting such a contextualized approach was that Canadian legal
culture, acting autonomously and without reference to social or economic
realities, has already resolved the particular problem that the United States
analysis isolates: the lack of a meaningful market for minority shares
in a squeeze out situation. Kroft argues that because Canadian corporate
law provides an artificial market for minority shareholders in some
situations of oppression, and despite the severe valuation problems that
arise in that artificial market, legal culture need not even engage in an
analysis of the social and economic context in which those legal provisions
might operate.s Law is omniscient, and Kroft is fully confident that legal
norms are themselves capable of solving all policy problems without
reference to any other systems of knowledge.
B. Realism
The realist tradition challenges the closed formalism of doctrinal
analysis and argues that the study of law properly involves the study
of the political, social, economic, and historical contexts that shape legal
49 Terence Baines, "Company Liability for Preincorporation Contracts" (1958) 16 U. Toronto
LJ. 31 at 37 (arguing that promises should be enforceable if they are made in the ordinary course
of business).
50 Stanley Beck, Comment (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 589 at 593 (contending that legislative
intent should be considered in interpreting a new statutory provision).
51 Joseph Chertkow, "Compulsory Acquisition of Shares under Section 199 of the Canada
Business Corporations Act and Re Whitehorse Copper Mines Ltd." (1982-83) 7 Can. Bus. LJ.
154 at 161.
52 Edwin Kroft, "Further Reflections on 'Going Private' - Towards a Rational Scheme of
Regulating Minority Squeeze-out Transactions" (1981) 13 Ottawa L. Rev. 356 at 412-13.
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culture.53 Canadian legal scholars have had the opportunity to observe
and comment on rapid and profound changes in the patterns of economic
behaviour and political activity that directly comprise its context. An
accelerating pace of change in technologies and in distributions of financial
power and communications has made it far less profitable for businesses
to be conceptualized as stable hierarchies, controlled by a formal, coherent
set of rules giving some flexibility only to a few powerful persons at
the top rank. Instead, "[I]t has become possible - necessary - to think
of organizations as a metaphor for the agreements of many people to
work more or less in concert."5, However, even when political recognition
of such changes has compelled legal scholars to note that a major revision
of corporation law or securities regulation has taken place, their comments
focus on the specific provisions that have changed, rather than on the
overall political patterns or on the fundamental theoretical issues.
Some commentary and law reform studies focus on statutory
alternatives that would change procedures and outcomes. Here the
emphasis is typically on the effect of wide alternative statutory provisions,
some of which may be drawn from other jurisdictions.55 There is little
rigorous examination, analysis, or assessment of the evidence that is
considered to support political, economic, or social policy arguments,
nor is there any significant examination of the relevance of those
arguments to the proposed reform.
There are numerous occasions when some comparative material is
introduced, such as parallel provisions of provincial statutes and of
provincial/federal or Canada/United Kingdom/United States statutes.
Historical development of statutory treatment is also common. However,
the level of comparative analysis applied to such material is confined
to noting that differences exist, and speculating on the extent to which
future courts will apply the same analysis as has been developed under
the compared statute. There is almost no discussion of different economic,
political, or other contextual factors that might support scholarly functions
of insight and generalization. Where some discussion of geographic
context is almost unavoidable, as in discussions comparing Canadian
and United States securities law, all too often the writer is content merely
53 Styles of argument in the literature of legal realism include comparative analysis of legal
provisions by reference to their differing social contexts, empirical studies that use social science
techniques to identify and assess the relations between law and context, and economic analyses
of the impact of law.
54 Rose Moss, Book Review (1984) 2 Women's Review of Books 6.
55 Specific language alternatives and techniques of statutory construction are neglected in the
classical tradition.
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to note that the securities markets in the two countries are enormously
different in terms of size and structure, without either describing specifics
of contextual differences or developing arguments for their relevance.
Similarly, comparisons of corporate law provisions do not take the details
of jurisdictional context into account. For example, it would be relevant
in comparing the rights and remedies that investors have against directors
to observe that, in contrast to the United States, much investment in
Canadian business is from foreign sources, and that Canadian statutes
require that some directors be Canadian.
Despite the fact that the literature on the social and economic context
of corporate and securities law in Canada has grown dramatically in
the last fifteen years - through the efforts of Canadian scholars and
as a spillover effect of original work by United States scholars - legal
realism has had only a limited effect on the Canadian style of corporate
legal scholarship. Legal realism in corporate law most nearly achieved
perfection in 1974, in Stanley Beck's article on shareholder derivative
actions. 56 Although the article employs traditional case analysis and
statutory construction in discussing the topic, Beck makes extensive use
of non-Canadian material (both United States and United Kingdom-
Commonwealth sources are used), including information on the cultural
contexts in which these materials have been developed. Beck grounds
his discussion in a political context as well, questioning the accountability
of large corporations to the population at large and the coherence of
the law in structuring an appropriate mechanism for realizing that
accountability.
Beck argues that the 'ballot box' approach to accountability is no
longer adequate, since it reflects only shareholder interests and does not
reflect the fact that large corporate bureaucracies have other important
constituencies. Drawing on the earlier realist work of Berle and Means,
Beck rejects the classical view that the corporation is an entity that exists
in order to optimize profits for shareholders. He instead takes the position
that the constituency of the corporation is the entire citizenry and that
the shareholders are mere rentiers of capital. Thus, his goal is to devise
new methods of corporate government or "new modalities of accoun-
tability" through which to respond to this new reality.
Even though Beck uses an historical analysis to support the thesis,
it is the essential non-contextuality of this apparent historical analysis
that eventually limits it. Having never examined whether the 'ballot box'
concept of accountability actually served the 'old' reality appropriately,
Beck's proposals for new modalities of accountability are not grounded
56 Stanley Beck, "The Shareholders' Derivative Action" (1974) 52 Can. Bar Rev. 159.
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in anything more concrete than seemingly utopian beliefs about how
alternative methods of accountability might operate in a complex culture.
Although he does take some economic factors into consideration, he
does not draw on any non-legal material in imagining how appropriate
alternative methods might best be structured, and he certainly does not
conduct any research of his own into the issues that he raises. Wonderful
though this article is (in comparison with classicist writing), it is flawed
by Beck's confidence that the 'legal mind' is capable of autonomously
perceiving all information that might be relevant to the design of laws
- the belief that a legal scholar's intuitively received knowledge is superior
to other types of information.
This criticism of Beck's article also makes it possible to illustrate
a criticism of the SSHRC report. The SSHRC report appears to treat
all legal writing that goes beyond mere manipulation of judicial and
statutory doctrine - such as comparative, economic, and historical studies
- as being equivalent to each other and as being adequate and superior
alternative techniques for scholarship. We would disagree as to their
adequacy (and probably as to their superiority as well). A noncontextual
or ahistorical comparative study is not necessarily any better than a study
which is noncontextual, ahistorical, and noncomparative, for the method
of both merely boils down to reiterative and manipulative doctrinal
discussion.57
When would a study such as the Beck article leave the realm of
doctrine and speculation as to the implications of knowledge, and enter
the realm of 'scholarship' as defined in the SSHRC report? According
to the report, it would enter the realm of 'scholarship' when the intuitions
and speculations that are treated as knowledge in that article become
the subject matter of as rigorous and searching a critique as is now
associated with doctrinal manipulations. By arguing for greater contex-
tuality in all possible forms, the report implicitly adopts a realist theory
of legal scholarship. Empiricism and 'scholarly research' as routes to
improving the product of legal research is a realist claim, albeit one
that is rarely articulated in such a direct fashion.5s
Even though the Beck article falls into the category of speculative
and provocative legal scholarship, it certainly does not stimulate scholarly
57 Indeed, a noncontextual or ahistorical comparative study would be twice as bad as a
noncontextual, ahistorical, and noncomparative study.
58 See David Trubek, "Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism" (1984)
36 Stan. L. Rev. 575, who argues that the realist project cannot be completed until both empirical
and political/theoretical approaches are used in legal research.
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inquiry into the issue of corporate accountability. The article is required
reading in some business associations courses, but it has not really had
any effect on policy formation, which says quite a lot for the status
of legal realism (and of legal scholarship) in Canada. Our survey of
corporate legal scholarship has uncovered very little additional material
that can even be considered to be 'realist', according to the terms of
our working definition, and none of it tries to deal with Beck's speculations.
In the 'barely realist' category we would place historical and empirical
studies that do have the advantage of contextualizing legal doctrine, but
that fail to actualize the challenge of realism to confront the political
content of legal doctrine. Canadian legal scholars have produced some
excellent work in this barely realist category. Gerald McGuigan, an
economic historian at the University of British Columbia, has explored
the origins of the corporate form from an historical viewpoint, and has
concluded that its historical origins are distinguishable from its legal
origins as found in precedent.9 He approaches a realist perception of
the relationship between law and history when he speculates that "we
search for some sort of historical continuity in the evolution of the legal
concept of the corporate form [because] current legal definitions of the
corporation ... are foremost in our minds."6o His conclusion challenges
settled beliefs about the relationship between business practices and the
function of law, for he is persuaded that forms of organization arise
spontaneously at the behest of business people, and are not created "at
the permission of law."
McGuigan stops short of discussing the legitimating function, and
therefore the political function, that law must play in such a process,
for not all intents and not all methods of achieving those intents have
been granted the status of legality that corporate law confers. Although
hinting at the types of factors that might account for the substantive
content of corporate law, McGuigan does not explore them explicitly,
nor does he develop his intuitive perception that lawyers have played
some role in the articulation of substantive rules. When Richard Risk,
a legal historian, attempted the same type of analysis of the origins of
Canadian corporate law, he took even less notice of the non-legal
determinants of corporate law norms. His article might be classifiable
as barely realist because Risk at least attempts a comparative (Canada
and United States) study, but the 'legal' history is largely just that -
59 Gerald McGuigan, "The Emergence of the Unincorporated Company in Canada" (1964)
2 U.B.C.L. Rev. 31.
60 Ibid at 33.
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a noncontextual discussion of statutory and case materials, combined
with a touch of social history and some so-called 'empirical' work.6,
Also in the barely realist category are studies that employ a more
conventional empirical methodology to test assumptions upon which law
reform proposals are based. While realism does admit of empiricism,
these studies are in the 'barely' subcategory because they, like the historical
studies, stop short of confronting the political content of their theses,
as well as of the rules or proposals they are investigating. Thus Peter
Williamson, in his empirical study of the securities industry for the
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, collects a large amount
of data on the economics of the Canadian brokerage business, commission
rates, securities-related activities of banks and trust companies, other
institutions, and investors. He then contextualizes the data in Canadian-
United States comparisons and draws 'policy implications' from his
discussions.2 Yet this paper, despite the fact that it draws up specific
recommendations, hardly touches upon the political context of its subject,
and buries politics under a mountain of so-called objective data. This
is inevitable in light of Williamson's position as a consultant to the
government during the course of the study, but the very impossibility
of overtly discussing the politics of law in law reform work raises a
serious criticism of the function of the law reform process.
Other empirical work is relegated to the barely realist category not
only because it appears to be oblivious to political context, but also because
the empirical methodology itself has some suspect features. For example,
one empirical study into insider trading consists of a review of other
studies on the extent of insider trading in Canada and the United States,
a survey of insiders' attitudes as to whether insider trading is a problem,
and conclusions as to how the legal system should deal with that problem.63
Not surprisingly, the largest number of respondents thought that the legal
system was not important in eliminating insider trading, but rather,
favoured civil or administrative penalties, instead of criminal penalties,
for breach of the rules.6 Other studies appear to use statistical data more
out of a desire to buttress a pro-business stance, than a desire to pro-
61 It is interesting to see what passes for 'empirical' work in legal scholarship. In the Risk
article, he investigated the subject matter of 150 judicial decisions relating to corporate law, and
discovered that they could largely be classified into four categories: shareholder-creditor priorities,
calls for subscribed capital, corporate capacity, and corporate seals.
62 Peter Williamson, "Canadian Financial Institutions" in Philip Anisman et aL, eds., Proposals
for a Securities Market Law for Canada- Background Papers (1979) 719.
63 Edward Rosenblaum et aL, "Corporate and Investment Attitudes Towards Insider Trading
in Canada" (1983-84) 8 Can. Bus. LJ. 485.
(Abid at 489.
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duce new empirical data out of the disinterested curiosity that is thought
to be the hallmark of scholarly inquiry.6s One of the very few studies
that combines an awareness of the realities of political context with
empirical methodology is C. Ashley's study of interlocking directorates,
in which he found that ninety-seven individuals who were directors of
Canadian banks held 930 other directorships in other groups in every
sector of the economy.66 Is it mere accident that this study was conducted
by a political scientist, and not by a lawyer?
C. Reconstructors
Reconstructed classicists are scholars who yearn for the simpler days
of legal positivism, but who have been so affected by the legal realist
movement that they can no longer deny the relevance of so-called public
policy considerations in analyzing legal issues.6 Within the realm of
corporate legal scholarship, two forms of reconstructed classicism are
found in the literature of corporate law. In one, economic positivism
appears to supplant the legal positivism of classicism as the source of
ultimate truth about corporate law. For example, a recent article published
by the University of Toronto purports to settle the question of whether
the principle of limited liability in corporate law should be continued
and under what circumstances.68 The issue is framed exclusively in terms
of economic efficiency, with efficiency being analyzed by reference to
allocation of resources, functioning of capital markets, and transaction,
65 See, for example, Colin Goff & Charles Reasons, "Corporations in Canada: A Study of
Crime and Punishment" (1976) 18 Crim. L.Q. 468 (argues against the use of economic data in
anti-combines prosecutions because of its 'legalistic' bias).
66 C.A. Ashley, "Concentration of Economic Power" (1957) 23 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sc. 105;
this study was cited in John Porter, The Vertical Mosaic (1967) at 234-35.
67 Mensch actually identifies a number of strands of reconstructor thought, such as public
law reconstructors and private law reconstructors. The small number of articles and books that
fall into these subcategories in the corporate and securities law area makes it meaningless to try
to make such fine distinctions in this essay; only the general concept of reconstructed positivism
will be used here. See supra, note 2 at 29-37.
The reconstructed classical tradition re-introduces positivist and determinist beliefs about truth,
knowledge, and coherence. The theoretical styles of reconstructed classicism include a neo-liberal
reliance on procedure to mediate pluralistic values that ultimately rests on natural law concepts
of deep structures of equality rights and rationality; see Salter, supra, note 28 for a feminist critique
of Ronald Dworkin's version of natural law. It also is manifested in the concepts of efficiency
and distributional expectations applied in some economic analysis of law; see, for example, Richard
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (1977) at 185 for the view that morality equals efficiency.
Reconstructor styles based in the social sciences involve theories "defined as statements concerning
factual regularities, and method as techniques to validate theory by testing it against the facts."
Trubek, supra, note 58 at 584; see, for example, David & Chava Nachmias, Research Methods
in the Social Sciences (1981).
68 Paul Halpern etaL, "An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law" (1980)
30 U. Toronto L. 117. The impetus for this study can be traced directly to the work of United
States economic positivists such as Posner and Manne.
(VOL. 23 No. 4
Corporate Law in Legal Theory and Legal Scholarship
information, and related costs.69 The authors conclude that limited liability
is most efficient for large and widely held corporations, but that unlimited
liability is more inefficient for small and closely held corporations, because
they tend to exploit the moral hazards to investors that are associated
with power imbalances7o
John Howard's paper on securities regulation is less obviously an
exercise in economic positivism than the Halpern study, but economic
positivism it is.7' Purporting to survey alternative models for an appropriate
regulatory market, Howard frames his inquiry in strictly economic terms
by asserting that there are three basic government functions: allocation
of resources, distribution of income, and economic stability (this last point
is defined as efficient and non-inflationary exploitation of resource use).
Looking only at these criteria, he then examines the economic function
of the securities market in choosing the most appropriate regulatory model.
While this approach certainly exhibits the realist sensitivity to context,
the only relevant context in this study turns out to be neo-liberal economic
theory, with economic criteria serving the same positivist function that
legal doctrine served in the legal positivism of classicism.
The second type of reconstructed classicism that appears in Canadian
corporate law scholarship is best characterized as 'rejection of contex-
tuality'. These writers are almost neo-classical in their desire to work
out the implications of autonomous law. They appear to be prevented
from totally ignoring social and economic context only by the very terms
of the discourse in which they are engaged. Such an approach was taken
in Philip Siller's 1976 discussion of the effectiveness of government
directors as a method of ensuring that corporate behaviour reflects public
interest.72 With no attempt to look at political context beyond the vague
notion that corporations may not always act in the public interest, and
with no data upon which to base his assertions, Sillers 'concludes' that
their legal duties as directors prevent government appointees from truly
acting in the public interest. His alternative solution is to allow national
political debate and open policy formation to run their course; both of
these forces, he argues, will adequately guard the public interest3 Although
Sillers does not completely ignore policy implications, he uses them
69 Ibid at 126.
70 Ibid at 147.
71 John Howard, "Securities Regulation: Structure and Process" in supra, note 62, 1607.
72 Phillip Siller, "'Taming' the Modem Corporation Through Government Directors" (1976)
34 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 30.
73 Ibid. at 39-40.
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intuitively rather than empirically in producing his recommendations,
and in this, he is certainly following the classical tradition.
D. Oppositionalists
In contrast to a positivist view of theory, in which beliefs about
reality are presented as propositions about facts that can be verified by
systematic observation, the oppositional modes of legal scholarship present
theory as forms of reflective consciousness or self-understanding in
existing social relations. They seek to demonstrate alternatives to the
"dominant forms of self-understanding" in the culture,74 and thus that
theory is a political choice.75
The few oppositionalist insights that have been discussed by Canadian
corporate and securities scholars have thus far been marginal, if not
tangential, and have relied on material developed by scholars in other
disciplines. Gray E. Taylor in his comment on the Ontario Securities
Commission76 shows a basic level of awareness of the underlying political
nature of institutional theories and frequently cites a leading multidis-
ciplinary social science study published in a public administration journal.7
Taylor, referring to the difficulty in identifying a unitary public interest
rather than "the interest of some group which the decision-maker confuses
with the public," first sets up a traditional legal solution, and then rejects
it on the ground that the decisions to be made may be inherently political.78
However, Taylor does not describe or examine relevant political alter-
natives as such. Indeed, he seems to attribute the pressure for regulation
to improve market conditions, for example, to merely uninformed outsiders
seeking "the sudden and absolute application of economic theory that
might well be inappropriate in a country whose existence in some ways
defies that very theory."79 He does not go on to examine alternative
74 A. Wellmer, quoted in supra, note 58 at 593.
75 David Trubek considers that the oppositional scholarship of the critical legal studies movement
is "the first time Post-Realist legal scholars have been able fully to accept the implications one
must draw from Realism, namely that no clear line can be drawn between legal scholarship and
politics." Supra, note 58 at 584. The styles of the oppositional mode in legal scholarship includes
the law and society analyses of sociological elite accommodation phenomena, pragmatic marshalling
of social science data as a strategic basis for incremental, intuitively attractive reform, and the
neo-Marxist analysis of legal culture as a hegemonic phenomenon legitimating the interests of
the dominant class.
76 Gray E. Taylor, "Comments on the Mandate and Operation of the Ontario Securities
Commission" (1978) 36 U. Toronto Fac. L. Rev. 1.
77 G. Bruce Doern et at, "The Structure and Behavior of Canadian Regulatory Boards and
Commissions: Multidisciplinary Perspectives" (1975) 18 Can Pub. Admin. 189, cited in ibid at
notes 37, 108-12.
78 Supra, note 76 at 40.
79 Ibid at 8.
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economic theories, or their political foundations. Elsewhere, unlike most
legal scholars who venture beyond doctrine, Taylor does not limit his
comments to suggesting that there may be alternative economic theories
based on political choice. However, he does mention the class background
and bureaucratic culture of the regulators, and notes the phenomenon
of elite accommodation.so At most, there is only what can be termed
inchoate development of an oppositional mode in Canadian corporate
and securities legal scholarship.
IV. CONNECTIONS AND GAPS: DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE
RESEARCH
The invisibility of contextual and theoretical influences in scholarly
output reflects how completely corporate law scholars are submerged
in the folklore, the ideology, or (most recently) the discourse of bureau-
cratic capitalism.81 That discourse is not confined to the 'magic words'
necessary to demonstrate good business reasons for freezing out minority
shareholders, to get government and judicial recognition of incorporation,
or to obtain approval of new securities issues. Instead it is a whole system
in which "certain social acts are established and maintained, certain social
objects are valued, certain languages are spoken, certain types of behaviour
are required and certain motivations are encouraged."82
In looking to the prospects for legal scholarship, the dominance
of the discourse of bureaucratic capitalism strongly suggests that we shall
see much more of what we have seen already. The power of the reality
principle,83 as it is defined in that system is amply demonstrated in the
continuing invisibility of reflectiveness, even in the very face of acknowl-
edged political transformations of statutory patterns and with explicit
use of comparative material. The prospects for writing that will show
different scholarly perspectives and challenge the dominant, implicit
perspective depend upon the existence (and publication) of scholars who
belong to groups that have been so socially marginalized that they have
not fully internalized the terms of the discourse of bureaucratic capitalism.84
Women are one such group, some of whose members have in recent
years been admitted to the fraternity of legal scholarship. Feminist theory
generates challenging new perspectives for analysis of legal phenomena
generally, even in the unlikely area of corporate law.
80 Ibid at 39.
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Women academics sometimes admit that they feel a comfort in
corporate law that is not available to them in other, more apparently
personal, areas of law. The invisibility of women in capitalist discourses
is a comfort, for women are only infrequently participants, as investors
or (less frequently) as corporate officers. Issues of oppression and power
relations arise only between rich white males; the whole drama of
corporate law thus has an air of unreality, a sort of legal 'star wars'.
On reflection, however, it is apparent that the impacts of corporate
cultures are not in fact marginal to the experiences of women. One central
organizing principle in complex capitalist interaction is the isolation and
separation of people from property and from the impact that their actions
have on other people. Another theme is abstraction - human interactions
that are focused on single, limited transactions, instead of taking place
in full context, over time. Women can therefore begin to speculate on
the development of a feminist critical mode that is organized around
the values of contextuality, continuity, and holistic participation.8s
Women who are struggling to find connections between their feminist
selves and the legal discourses of corporate capitalism are advised to
resist easy identification with popular trends in thinking about progressive
organization forms. The European movement toward worker participation
in two-tier management structures86 and the North American rush to
accommodate worker buy-outs of failing corporations87 superficially give
expression to the ideals of participation, decentralization, power sharing,
reintegration of ownership and labour - but they are certainly not feminist
movements. Neither is the growing interest in the Japanese management
85 One example is a reversal of the free transferability of shares. An advantage of 'lock-in'
that even Keynes recognized was that it would make people very careful about their initial choices
as shareholders. From the company's perspective, the concept of lock-in reverses (in the company's
favour) the whole general concept that shareholders do not have a vested right to the enterprise,
but rather can be bought out, at fair value. Fragments of existing corporate discourse have anticipated
this theme. The quasi-partnership cases, the going-private controversies, and the noted reluctance
of the judiciary to permit compulsory acquisition under the apparently liberal terms of modem
corporate legislation, all touch on the theme of who has the power to treat shareholder interests
as being permanently locked in.
86 See Detlev Vagts, "Reforming the 'Modem' Corporation: Perspectives From the German"
(1966) 80 Harv. L. Rev. 23 for basic information on this management/worker participation. See
also, Detlev Vagts, "European Perspectives: A Forward" (1979) 30 Hastings L.. 1413, and Clive
Schmitthoff, "Social Responsibility in European Company Law" ibid 1419.
87 A profound shift in the underlying moral purpose of the corporation has already occurred
with the trend toward incorporating worker buy outs of failing businesses as not for profit corporations.
This trend creates opportunities to rethink the major and minor premises of corporate law, and
could even reopen some of the basic questions under business corporation statutes. In the United
States, both federal taxation and state not-for-profit corporate statutes are being amended to facilitate
this use of those statutes; the 1985 Canadian budget has proposed income tax amendments to
facilitate worker participation. It remains to be seen whether the 'workers' who become involved
in management in these buy outs will be rich executives (the usual case) or line workers.
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model, with its emphasis on worker security, continuity, and management
responsibilities.8s Each of these modifications on the traditional business
corporation remains profoundly patriarchal in practice as well as in ethics.
If feminists feel moved to explore these variants, it should be to discover
how feminist and masculist versions of concepts like participation,
flattening of hierarchies, and so on, differ from each other, and how
cultural barriers presently operate to prevent feminists from realizing
their goals on a scale that is large enough to seriously challenge the
patriarchal mentality in the business world.89 Patriarchal social orders
have demonstrated themselves to be incredibly durable and capable of
absorbing and co-opting all sorts of challenges to patriarchal hegemony.90
Feminists have already started a revolution by withdrawing support from
the patriarchal nuclear family; perhaps it can be completed by concen-
trating now on the other main situs of male domination - the business
corporation.
The issues that women must confront in such a project will not
be trivial ones. Since masculist corporate legal scholars have not taken
the effect of male domination into account in explaining the rise of the
corporate form,9' feminists should do some basic research on the re-
lationship between patriarchal culture and the development of business
corporations. Such a contextualizing project appears even more urgent
in the face of the wholesale exportation of western patriarchal culture,
corporatized ethics, instrumentalized business executives, and the whole
mentality of capitalist exploitation, along with what are euphemistically
referred to as 'technology transfers' in the 'development process'. Feminist
economists have begun the project of describing just how early European
88 Somewhat incredibly, we have seen popular discussions of the Japanese management model
that draw strong connections with 'feminist' management principles, despite the fact that Japan
is an intensely patriarchal culture. So strong is the expectation that women will marry at a young
age that Japanese corporations simply do not provide for 'deviant' female employees. According
to a Japanese observer, women employees who approach the age of thirty without voluntarily
withdrawing from employment are routinely driven out of their jobs, a practice that severely
marginalizes all women workers. Japanese women have only recently organized to challenge this
practice.
89 As Kanter's earlier work suggests, it will not be sufficient (although it will be necessary)
for feminist researchers to develop detailed accounts of feminist forms of organization and their
relationships to legal norms; researchers will also have to chronicle the ways in which the larger
economic context affects feminist processes.
90 See generally, Zillah Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (1981), which sets
out an excellent foundation for such a project. Eisenstein surveys the major epochs in western
patriarchal culture from the perspective of political theory. Given the political content of legal
norms, this is a particularly useful starting point.
9' Compare Morton Horowitz, The Legitimation of Corporations (Harvard Law School, 1985)
[unpublished].
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development has contributed to the worldwide domination of women;92
it is now time for feminist lawyers to begin to tell how the processes
and ethics of corporate law contribute directly and indirectly to the
domination of women.93 As with the original Star Wars (which started
out as an apparently benign fantasy, a diversion), what feminists had
initially thought was just a silly (male) fancy of the corporate world
might well turn out to be a truly dreadful reality that women ignore
at their peril.
92 The leading work is Esther Boserup, Women and Economic Development (1970); it should
be read together with Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) (the classic work
on the theory of economic underdevelopment and exploitation); and Oscar Lewis, Five Families
(1959) (a dramatic account of Mexican underdevelopment/exploitation). A reading of Lillian Rubin,
Worlds of Pain (1976) suggests that working class women in North America could also be considered
to be 'underdeveloped' in the sense in which Rodney uses the term. For details on just what aspects
of western industrialized culture are being transferred to lesser (technologically) developed countries,
see any issue of South magazine.
93 The sensible starting place for this undertaking is the law school classroom. A comprehensive
rereading of corporate law which scrutinizes the values and practices of the legal subculture of
business corporations and their relationships to patriarchal bureaucratized culture cannot/should
not be carried out by isolated individuals. Of course, 'teaching' methods would also have to be
changed, for this is not an 'issue' to which there are any 'answers'. Feminist pedagogy can make
a significant contribution here, for the feminist emphasis on process in education (as elsewhere)
has enabled feminist academics to learn how to relinquish the 'control' and 'authority' that
unfortunately is such a characteristic of legal education in masculist hands.
Cynthia Lichtenstein has suggested that law teachers can contribute significantly to a change
in the consciousness of corporate culture simply by turning basic corporate concepts "on their
heads." For example, she suggests that feminist academics can approach the topic of "duty of
care" as an ongoing feature of enterprise relationships instead of as a "crisis concept." This is
a crucial function, for feminist approaches will have little impact on the present culture until they
can be operationalized in law and in business practice in light of the very real factors that will
oppose that operationalization. Mary Joe Frug has developed a highly effective technique for this
kind of teaching that combines the feminist process of consciousness raising with a supportive
conversational format that she calls "reading cases as feminists." These kinds of openended processes
will be needed to create the kinds of moments of knowing that we have envisioned in this essay.
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